국제정치론 2015 가을학기 제 10 주 (1) 최현진 정경대학 정치외교학과

Presentation on theme: "국제정치론 2015 가을학기 제 10 주 (1) 최현진 정경대학 정치외교학과"— Presentation transcript:

1 국제정치론 2015 가을학기 제 10 주 (1) 최현진 정경대학 정치외교학과 choihj@khu.ac.kr

2 제 10 주 (1) 전쟁의 원인 2

3 1. 전쟁의 원인 : 동맹이론

4 동맹 동맹이란 두 개 이상의 국가들 간의 안보협력을 위한 공식 · 비공식적 협정 (Stephen Walt) – 상호방위조약 – 중립 / 불가침 조약 – 양자동맹 vs. 다자동맹 – 쌍무동맹 vs. 일방동맹

5 동맹의 비용 물질적 비용 – 분담금, 기지제공 비용 비물질적 비용 – 외교정책의 자주성 버려지기 (Abandonment) 의 위험성 끌려 들어가기 (Entrapment) 의 위험성

6 동맹의 행태 힘이 약한 쪽과 동맹을 맺어 균형을 이루는 균형전략 (Balancing) 힘이 강한 쪽과 동맹을 맺는 편승전략 (Bandwagoning)

7 균형전략 VS 편승전략 Balancing Behavior Balancing: states allying with each other against the prevailing threat. In this scenario, state are more secure because the threatening state faces a united opposition. There are two main reasons why states balance: –To halt the power of a potential hegemon before it gains too much power –Joining the weaker side enables the state to wield more power within the alliance.

8 균형전략 VS 편승전략 Bandwagoning Behavior Bandwagoning: state allying with the source of danger. In this scenario, there is less security because the threatening state increases its power whereas the opponents’ power is reduced. –If statesmen believe that bandwagoning is widespread, they will be more inclined to use force. States bandwagon to appease and to benefit from potential victory. This strategy is dangerous because a state can never be sure the greater power won’t change its intentions and attack the smaller state when it gets the chance.

9 2. 전쟁의 원인 : 세력전이이론

10 세력전이이론 (Power Transition) A.F.K. Organski 핵심 가정 1. 안보가 국가의 궁극적 목표 2. 국력증대는 국가안보를 증대하기 위한 수단 3. 산업화를 통한 경제성장  국력의 증대 4. 국제체제는 패권국가에 의한 위계체제 (hierarchical system) 1) 지배국가 (dominant power) 2) 강대국군 (major powers) 3) 중급국가군 4) 약소국군 5) 종속국가군

11 세력전이이론 (Power Transition) A.F.K. Organski

12 주장 : 새롭게 부상하는 강대국의 국력이 기존 지배국가의 국력에 접근할 때 전쟁가능성이 높아진다. – 도전자는 세력 전이를 촉진시키고 자신의 국력에 상응하는 이익 확보를 위해 전쟁을 개시 – 지배국가는 힘의 추월을 당하기 전에 예방전쟁을 감행 –The challenger may start a war because it thinks that now, for the first time, it has a good chance to win. –The dominant power may foresee its own strength declining and thus calculate that it is better to fight now than to risk waiting until its position may be significantly worse.

13 세력전이이론 (Power Transition) A.F.K. Organski 주요변수 – 도전국의 현존 질서에 대한 불만족도 – 세력전이가 일어나는 시기의 국제체제 구조 – 세력전이가 진행되는 속도

14 Global Power Index Forecast ( 출처 : National Intelligence Council)

15 패권안정이론 ( Hegemonic Stability ) Robert Gilpin 국제체제의 단계적 순환 –1 단계 ( 균형상태 ): 패권국이 국제질서를 확립. 공공재와 게임의 법칙을 제공. 체제 질서 유지 –2 단계 ( 국력 재분배 ): 국가간 국력증대 속도의 차이로 인한 패권국의 체제 지배력 약화 –3 단계 ( 불균형 ): 패권국에 도전하는 강대국의 급속한 성장. 전쟁위기 고조 –4 단계 ( 위기해소 ): 도전세력이 패권전쟁에서 승리하여 새로운 체제 질서를 수립

16 패권안정이론 ( Hegemonic Stability ) Robert Gilpin

17 3. 전쟁의 원인 : 체제전환

18 Democratization and War Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder (1995) The idea that democracies never fight wars against each other has become an axiom for many scholars. –In his 1994 State of the Union address, President Clinton asserted that no two democracies had ever gone to war with each other, thus explaining why promoting democracy abroad was a pillar of his foreign policy. However, countries do not become mature democracies overnight. Rather, they must go through a difficult transitory period. In this transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, and they do fight wars with democratic states.

19 Democratization and War The Argument: Formerly authoritarian states where democratic participation is on the rise are more likely to fight wars than are stable democracies or autocracies. –States that make the biggest leap, from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy—like contemporary Russia—are about twice more likely to fight wars during democratization than are states that remain autocracies.

20 Democratization and War This argument raises questions about the policy of promoting peace by promoting democratization. The expectation that the spread of democracy will probably contribute to peace in the long run provides little comfort to those who might face a heightened risk of war in the short run. –Pushing nuclear-armed great powers like Russia or China toward democratization is like spinning a roulette wheel: many of the outcomes can be undesirable.

21 Democratization and War Democratization creates a wider spectrum of politically significant groups with diverse and incompatible interests. –Former party officials, military officers, free-market entrepreneurs, disgruntled workers, and newly mobilized ethnic groups. In principle, mature democratic institutions can integrate even the widest spectrum of interests. But when political parties and representative institutions are still in their infancy, the diversity of interests may make political coalitions difficult to maintain. Often the solution is a belligerent nationalist coalition.

22 Democratization and War Needing public support, ruling elites rouse the masses with nationalist propaganda but find that their mass allies, once mobilized by passionate appeals, are difficult to control. This is particularly true because democratization weakens the central government's ability to keep policy coherent and consistent.

23 Democratization and War The volatility inherent in such a situation makes the state prone to war. –Elites can shore up its prestige at home by seeking victories abroad (Mobilization strategy). –They can also create an external situation that diverts attention from them, insulating them from critical domestic opponents and popular demands (Insulation strategy).